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Resumen — Este artículo analiza la relación entre el gobierno corporativo de los servicios del agua italianos (propiedad, tamaño y composición del consejo) y su 
efi ciencia medida a través del análisis envolvente de datos (AED). Usando un modelo general de regresión de datos de panel averiguamos que el tamaño 
del consejo afecta negativamente la efi ciencia de los servicios del agua. Además, la presencia de directores con afi liaciones políticas o que son o fueron 
miembros del gobierno local o nacional afecta negativamente a la efi ciencia, y la presencia de directores con una carrera universitaria en el consejo tiene 
un efecto ligeramente negativo sobre la productividad. Inversamente, otras variables (propiedad, diversidad de género y edad media de los miembros del 
consejo) no afectan a la efi ciencia de los servicios del agua italianos. La existencia de economías de escala también fue confi rmada.
Abstract — The present paper analyzes the linkage between the corporate governance of Italian water utilities (ownership, board size and board composition) and 
their effi ciency measured through data envelopment analysis (DEA). Using a general panel data regression model, we found that board size negatively 
affects the effi ciency of water utilities. Moreover, the presence of directors with political affi liations or who are/were members of local or national go-
vernment negatively affects effi ciency, and the presence of directors with a degree on the board has a slight negative effect on productivity. Conversely, 
other variables (ownership, gender diversity and average age of board members) were found not to affect the effi ciency of Italian water utilities. The 
existence of economies of scale was also confi rmed.
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INTRODUCTION
There are more than 2000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
OECD countries, employing close to 4.3 million people and with 
an estimated value exceeding US$1.3 trillion. They have a strong 
sectoral concentration, as around half (in terms of value) of all 
SOEs in OECD countries are located in the network sectors1. Mo-
reover, cities and towns have a very extensive portfolio of con-
trolling or minority equity stakes in companies of all sizes that 
operate in many different sectors of the economy. 
Recent data show that, in Italy, 97 percent of municipalities 
have stakes in the share capital of one or more businesses. They 
have a total of about 118,000 direct or indirect stakes in 6469 
different companies, of which 5288 are active companies, which 
employ a total of 285,000 workers. Moreover, on average, each 
of these companies has 6.5 board members and over half of the 
active companies have more board members than employees2. 
In fact, one of the much-debated issues in the current Italian 
government’s spending review has been expenses for the salaries 
of directors of companies that are wholly or partially owned by 
state and local government bodies.
The Italian water industry has undergone important re-
forms over the last 20 years, designed to end the direct supply 
of water and wastewater services through public administration 
by outsourc ing them to fi rms of independent public, mixed, or 
private ownership3. However, the Italian water supply system still 
presents a very complex landscape, with 75 percent of water 
industry operators being municipalities or other public bodies 
(e.g. consortia of local governments or mountain communities) 
that provide one or more water services directly “in house”4. Mo-
reover, public, mixed and private utilities now coexist, operating 
on different scales and with different strategic and organizational 
statuses (e.g. mono vs. multi utilities, stand-alone fi rm, corpo-
rate group). The close connection between Italian utilities and 
local government leads to the dominance of politically connected 
directors on the utilities’ boards5, fueling a debate about the best 
ownership structure and the best board size and composition for 
the satisfactory performance of local utilities. The board of di-
rectors is the key to good corporate governance, since it defi nes 
a fi rm’s corporate and business strategies and has an important 
advisory and counseling role6.
Although this issue has been highly debated among decision 
makers, scholars and citizens, the water industry literature to 
date has focused mainly on the ownership/performance linkage 
and lacks empirical investigations of the relationship between the 
effi ciency of water utilities and board size and composition. In 
particular, Menozzi et al. (2011) analyzed the effects of board 
composition on the production, distribution, and retail sales of 
gas, electricity, and water of 114 Italian local public utilities. The 
results show that politically connected directors dominate the 
 1 Christiansen, 2011.
 2 Cerved, 2014.
3 Guerrini and Romano, 2014. Massarutto and Ermano, 2013.
4 Guerrini and Romano, 2014.
5 Menozzi, Gutierrez Urtiaga, Vannoni, 2011. Romano and Guerrini, 2014.
6 Adams et al., 2010. Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001.
boards of Italian public utilities and exert a positive and signifi -
cant effect on employment and a negative impact on accounting 
performance. Romano and Guerrini (2014) specifi cally investiga-
ted the linkage between the fi nancial performance (measured 
using accounting results) and corporate governance of 72 Italian 
water utilities and found some relevant, albeit preliminary, re-
sults. Specifi cally, they show that private or mixed-ownership uti-
lities show higher profi tability than entirely publicly-owned fi rms, 
even if the latter are less debt-dependent. Furthermore, boards 
of Italian water utilities are dominated by politically connected 
directors, who boost access to debt and negatively affect the 
fi rms’ capital structures; board composition, in terms of the age 
and educational background of members, infl uences economic 
performance, since graduate and senior directors exert a negative 
infl uence on profi tability.
This paper seeks to add to the existing literature on water 
utility management by investigating whether the corporate go-
vernance of water utilities (i.e. their ownership, board size and 
board composition) affect fi rms’ decisions, ultimately impacting 
their performance in terms of the level of effi ciency reached. The 
present study uses a database compiled from 255 observations of 
85 Italian water utilities and over 1100 board members. It inclu-
des multi-year data (2010-2012) and applies a two-stage method, 
using data envelopment analysis (DEA) to determine the relative 
effi ciency of utilities and panel regression to analyze the rela-
tionship between their effi ciency and corporate governance and 
strategic features (ownership, board size, political connection, 
age, education and gender of board members, production value, 
number of employees, membership in a corporate group, and pro-
vision of gross sale water service). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The 
next section reviews the literature on the effects of privatization 
processes on the performance and corporate governance of fi rms 
and on the links between ownership, board size and composition, 
and fi rm performance. The third section describes the process 
of data collection for this research, as well as the methodology 
and analysis. The fourth section outlines the key fi ndings of our 
empirical research and discusses its main implications, and the fi -
nal section summarizes the fi ndings, offers suggestions for future 
research and discusses the limitations of this research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate governance of entities that are wholly or partially 
owned by the State or a local government and established to pur-
sue public policy and commercial objectives is a major challenge 
in many economies. There has been decades of research on the 
role of ownership and boards of directors in the governance of 
these corporate entities. Some authors argue that SOEs perform 
less effi ciently and less profi tably than privately owned ones7 and 
that ownership, together with competition, is important in pro-
moting effi ciency8. Agency theory9 attributes the disparity bet-
7 Boycko et al., 1996. Shleifer and Vishny, 1994.
8 Boardman and Vining, 1989. Bozec and Dia, 2007.
9 Jensen and Meckling, 1976.
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ween publicly owned corporations and private corporations to the 
differences in the principal-agent relationship—the principal’s 
objectives are related to the public interest in SOEs, whereas 
in private fi rms they are focused on maximizing the fi rm’s value. 
Moreover, in SOEs the manager (i.e. the agent) has two principals, 
the citizens/voters and government, whereas in private fi rms the 
principal is represented by the shareholders. The principal-agent 
model assumes that agency costs are greater in SOEs since the 
incentives to achieve cost reduction and effi ciency, and to super-
vise managers, are weak10. 
Boycko et al. (1996) show that the variable that explains the 
ineffi ciency of public fi rms is an agency problem with politicians 
rather than with managers. Indeed, many researchers11 concur 
that public enterprises are ineffi cient because their ineffi ciency 
serves the goals of politicians; these goals are not necessarily in 
line with profi t or value maximization but have to do with ensu-
ring success in elections and long tenures in power (through, for 
example, maximization of employment and wages, promotion of 
regional development, and provision of low-cost goods and ser-
vices).
As a consequence, privatization is considered an appropriate 
way to achieve signifi cant improvements in the performance of 
SOEs12, even if in some municipal services, such as urban water, 
ideological and political factors have an infl uence in the public 
choice of management13. Mixed ownership is often seen as wor-
se than wholly publicly or privately owned companies14, even if 
recent studies on water utilities contradict this result15. In fact, 
the results of privatization in the water industry are confl icting in 
terms of economic effi ciency and profi tability16, as well as invest-
ment and fi nancial structure17.
In Italy, privately owned utilities have been found to be more 
oriented toward profi t than their publicly owned counterparts, 
since their fi nancial ratios, such as ROS, are higher and fi nancial 
leverage is used more intensively18. Romano and Guerrini (2011) 
point out that publicly owned fi rms have the highest effi ciency 
scores because they purchase and employ inputs in a more effec-
tive way than mixed-ownership fi rms. Furthermore, Romano et 
al. (2013) fi nd that Italian public water utilities have healthier 
fi nancial structures than mixed-ownership fi rms, with higher sol-
vency and independence ratios. These results could be linked 
with the fact that boards of Italian water utilities are dominated 
by politically connected directors and that there is no signifi cant 
correlation between the ownership structure and the percentage 
of politically connected directors on the board, so that politicians 
10 Shleifer and Vishny, 1994. Sørensen, 2007.
11 Boubakri et al., 2008. Boycko et al., 1996. Dinc and Gupta, 2011.
12 Arocena and Oliveros, 2012. Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001. Dinc and Gup-
ta, 2011. Megginson et al., 1994. Shleifer, 1998.
13 Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012.
14 Boardman and Vining, 1989. Cruz and Marques, 2012. Eckel and Vining, 
1985.
15 Cruz et al., 2012.
16 Bakker, 2003. Carrozza, 2011. García-Sánchez, 2006. Lobina and Hall, 
2007.
17 Romano et al., 2013. Shaoul, 1997. Vinnari and Hukka, 2007. 
18 Guerrini et al., 2011. Romano and Guerrini, 2014.
are appointed frequently also in privatized utilities19. Indeed, the 
literature suggests that privatization without the transfer of con-
trol is unlikely to favor effi ciency and profi tability, unless fi rms’ 
choices are shielded from the infl uence of politicians and bureau-
crats20. According to Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) and Boubakri 
et al. (2008), even the sale of a majority stake is not in itself 
a suffi cient condition to avoid government interference, since 
many companies remain politically connected through at least 
one board member who is or was a politician21. Thus, if privati-
zed fi rms and their boards do not gain complete independence 
from national or local government infl uence, they are likely to 
face confl icting objectives, and politically connected fi rms will 
probably exhibit poorer accounting performance than their non-
connected counterparts22.
However, some scholars have argued that whereas politics 
is an important determinant of fi rm profi tability, politically ex-
perienced directors aid the fi rm with their knowledge of govern-
ment procedures and their insight into predicting government ac-
tions, and they may also act to enlist the government in the fi rm’s 
interest or to forestall government actions inimical to the fi rm23. 
Existing evidence in some cases highlights the positive effects of 
political connectedness on a fi rm’s value and performance24. Con-
versely, Faccio (2010) shows that while, on average, politically 
connected corporations have higher leverage, enjoy marginally 
lower taxation, and display much greater market power, they also 
have a lower ROA and market valuation than their peers. Menozzi 
et al. (2011) show that, in Italian local public utilities, politica-
lly connected directors exert a positive and signifi cant effect on 
employment, but have a negative impact on profi tability. More 
recently, Romano and Guerrini (2014) have highlighted that the 
presence of directors with political affi liations or who are/were 
members of local or national government boosts access to fi nance 
but negatively affects the fi nancial structures of Italian water 
utilities, in terms of decreasing their fi nancial autonomy and in-
creasing their debt-to-equity ratio. They also found that, unlike 
the fi ndings reported above, politically connected directors do 
not exert a negative impact on profi tability.
Specifi c legal provisions have regulated the size and compo-
sition of the boards of Italian utilities owned, totally or partly, 
by public shareholders: fully publicly owned utilities can appoint 
no more than fi ve board members, according to Law 78 of 2010. 
Mixed-owned utilities have no limitations concerning board size 
but a restriction is provided only for the number of members 
appointed by the public shareholders, which must be no more 
than fi ve, according to Law 296 of 2006. For both fully publicly 
owned and mixed-owned utilities, Law 138 of 2011 banned the 
appointment of any politicians who have operated in the previous 
three years as administrators of the local authority owning the 
utility. According to the literature, the question of what constitu-
tes an appropriate board size and composition is still a relevant 
19 Romano and Guerrini, 2014.
20 Gupta, 2005. Li and Xu, 2004. Shleifer and Vishny, 1998.
21 Boubakri et al., 2008.
22 Boubakri et al., 2008. Fan et al., 2007. Sørensen, 2007.
23 Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001.
24 Faccio, 2006. Goldman et al., 2009. Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010.
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topic in the corporate governance debate with reference not only 
to SOEs but to enterprises in general.
The empirical evidence of an optimal board size that might 
infl uence fi rm performance and effi ciency is inconclusive25; simi-
larly the literature on board composition highlights how board 
diversity, age and experience can contribute to improving fi rm 
performance26, although the empirical fi ndings are still controver-
sial27. The OECD’s (2012) best practices for SOEs affi rmed that es-
tablishing a transparent and consistent method to identify appli-
cants from a wider talent pool will improve board composition and 
bring uniformity in the assessment process; state representatives 
should be nominated based on qualifi cations and independent di-
rectors should be independent from management, government 
and business relationships. However, further research is needed 
on the broader effect of corporate governance on performance. 
This paper attempts to contribute to the existing literature on 
the governance-effi ciency linkage of water utility fi rms with an 
empirical research using multi-year data.
DATA AND METHOD
DATA COLLECTION
The process of data collection started from the database 
published by the Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity Gas 
and Water (AEEG), the Italian national water authority. This re-
port, available online on the AEEG website, includes information 
about all the 1235 independent fi rms and public bodies involved 
in Italy’s provision of water services at the end of 2013. Of these 
1235 operators, 75 percent (n. 931) are municipalities or other 
public bodies (such as consortia of local governments or mountain 
communities) that provide one or more water services directly 
“in house.” Thus, only 304 of the 1235 operators are independent 
fi rms (water utilities).
Analyzing the fi nancial statements and websites of the-
se 304 Italian water utilities, we fi nd that 202 of them provide 
only water services (mono-utilities) in contrast to those involved 
in other industries such as electricity, gas, or municipal waste 
management (multi-sector utilities). Further, according to the 
AEEG database, only 100 of these fi rms are mono-utilities that 
provide all the water services (collection, potabilization, adduc-
tion/transportation, distribution of water for civil use, sewera-
ge, and wastewater treatment). For the purposes of our study, 
we focused only on these 100 utilities, thus excluding companies 
that provide only some services or are multi-sector utilities. This 
makes it possible to eliminate from the statistical analysis the 
effect of differentiated operations and strategies, which could 
severely affect a fi rm’s performance28. 
The AEEG database also provides information about fi rms be-
longing to a group and whether they provide gross sale service 
as well. Such information is relevant because the economic and 
25 Golden and Zajac, 2001. Guest, 2009. Jensen, 1993.
 26 Adams and Ferreira, 2009. Boubakri et al., 2008. Carter et al., 2003. Er-
hardt, Werbel, and Shrader, 2003. Faccio, 2006. Forbes and Milliken, 1999.
27 Romano and Guerrini, 2014, and references therein.
28 Guerrini, Romano, and Campedelli, 2013.
effi ciency results could be affected by these strategic and orga-
nizational choices.
The list was cross-checked with the Analisi Informatizzata 
delle Aziende Italiane (AIDA) database of Bureau Van Dyck. Fo-
llowing Romano and Guerrini (2014), the AIDA database was used 
to collect data on governance items: size of the board of direc-
tors, percentage of women on the board, age of directors, ow-
nership structure, and distinction between “fully publicly-owned 
fi rm” and “not fully publicly-owned” fi rms. Moreover, we identi-
fi ed the number of directors on the board with university degrees 
and political connections by examining whether or not each di-
rector had a degree and held or had held political assignments, 
candidacies in national and local elections, and/or membership 
of a political party. According to Menozzi et al. (2011) and Ro-
mano and Guerrini (2014), directors were considered “politically 
connected” when they currently held a seat in parliament or in 
the municipal, provincial, or regional government or had held 
one in the past and, more generally, were affi liated with a politi-
cal party or had a well-known relationship with a political party. 
The fi rms’ websites, local newspaper websites and the main web 
search engines were used to identify the political connections of 
all the directors.
The AIDA database was also used to collect economic and 
fi nancial items for the three-year period analyzed (2010-2012): 
total revenues, value of production, depreciation, amortization 
and interest paid, staff costs, and other operative costs (e.g. ser-
vices, maintenance, materials) and number of employees.
The fi nal dataset obtained comprises 255 observations (85 
water utilities) that operate only in the water and wastewater in-
dustry providing all the water services. Information was collected 
on their 1,118 board members. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize some descriptive statistics on the 
governance, strategic, and economic variables involved.
Table 1. Types of Firms in the Dataset
Fully publicly 
owned Part of a group
Also provides gross 
sale service
Yes 174 (68.2%) 66 (25.9%) 135 (52.9%)
No 81 (31.8%) 189 (74.1%) 120 (47.1%)
Total 255 (100.0%) 255 (100.0%) 255 (100.0%)
The majority of the dataset consists of fully publicly owned 
fi rms (68%) that are not part of a broader group (74%). Around half 
of the dataset consists of utilities that also provide the gross sale 
service (Table 1).
The boards are composed of an average of four members, 
with a minimum of a single director and a maximum of nine 
members. On average, the boards are made up of 56 percent of 
politically connected directors and of 55 percent of college- or 
university-degreed members. There are on average nine percent 
of board members who are women, with around 70 percent of 
boards with no women and only one fi rm with a 100 percent fema-
le presence (i.e. a sole female director). The average age of the 
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board members is around 53 years (calculated as the average of 
the average age of the members of each board), but collectively 
they ranged from 39 to 68 years of age.
EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In order to estimate the level of effi ciency of water utilities, 
we applied a non-parametric frontier model called DEA29, which 
is an alternative to fi nancial ratios and parametric frontier30. 
Financial ratios allows for the development of benchmarking 
among many operating units, focusing on their fi nancial results. 
The main weakness of using them to measure performance, as 
operating profi t to collection revenues, is the lack of technical 
indicators that could estimate the effectiveness of customer ser-
vice and plants, and the quality of the water. The parametric 
frontier method is based on a multivariate regression analysis of 
a specifi c data set, formed by inputs and outputs of production 
(e.g. cost of labor, cost of capital and water delivered). Effi cien-
cy is measured by the distance between observed data and the 
maximum production represented by the frontier. Compared with 
the traditional ratio analysis31, the advantages of frontier mo-
dels are their high reliability, based on a mathematical approach, 
and their ability to measure effi ciency considering many inputs 
and outputs. Their main limitation is the need to choose a cost 
function (i.e. Cobb-Douglas, Translog) that cannot perfectly fi t 
with the research dataset. 
A non-parametric analysis such as DEA overcomes the limita-
tions of the fi nancial ratios and parametric analysis, since it does 
not require the specifi cation of any particular functional form to 
describe the effi cient frontier and enables the combination of 
multiple inputs and outputs. DEA compares each decision-making 
unit (DMU) with its related virtual “best” producer. Every virtual 
producer is identifi ed through a linear programming approach, 
which enquires whether it is possible for a real operative unit to 
obtain more output with the same input or to obtain the same 
output with less input32. DEA is grounded on an optimization algo-
rithm that assigns a score (between 0 and 1) to each DMU given 
the input consumed and the output produced, providing a ranking 
of fi rms based on their effi ciency. The difference between the 1 
and the score assigned to a single DMU shows the amount of input 
that should be saved (input-oriented optimization problem) or 
the increase of output that could be obtained given a certain in-
29 Charnes et al., 1990.
30 Guerrini et al., 2011.
31 Beaver, 1968. Davis and Peles, 1993.
 32 Farrell, 1957.
put (output-oriented optimization problem). Therefore, hypothe-
sizing to adopt DEA with an input orientation, a score of 0.77 
assigned to a DMU shows a 33 percent margin for input saving.
The linear programming problem can be defi ned by choosing 
two different alternatives: constant return to scale (CRS) or varia-
ble return to scale (VRS). In order to determine the scale effects, 
both the CRS and VRS models are often adopted in research pa-
pers. The former considers that DMUs are able to linearly scale 
the inputs and outputs without any variation in effi ciency33. The 
use of both DEA models34 enables the establishment of three in-
dexes: CRSTE (constant return technical effi ciency), VRSTE (va-
riable return technical effi ciency) and SE (scale effi ciency). The 
fi rst represents the global effi ciency of a DMU, given by pure effi -
ciency and scale; the second measures the real capability of a 
company to purchase, mix and consume inputs; while the third 
indicates the correctness of the choice to operate with a certain 
production scale. Thanassoulis (2000) claims that fi rms can be 
evaluated for their global effi ciency regardless of the true nature 
of the return to scale in the water industry, and, despite counter-
arguments such as the infl uence of non-controllable contextual 
variables on SE, he adopts a CRS model in his study. Garcia-Valiñas 
and Muñiz (2007) used a similar approach, while the majority of 
DEA studies have favored the joint use of CRS and VRS in order to 
highlight the real determinants of global effi ciency.
The DEA model chosen for the current study applies an input 
orientation and VRS as follows:
where “ф” represents the effi ciency of DMU “j0m,” and “λjxjm” is 
the virtual DMU obtained combining input “x” consumed by the 
other DMUs “jm,” properly weighted with “λ.”
33 Charnes et al., 1978.
 34 Banker, 1984.
Table 2. Descriptive Features of the Firms in the Dataset
Board size %politics %degree %women Age Prod. value Staff
Mean 4.36  56  55   9 52.69 41,158,737.32 174.58
Median 5  60  60   0 53 18,853,392.68 83.68
Standard deviation 1.92  36  31  17  5.57 77,551,177.68 300.45
Minimum 1   0   0   0 3 9 638,013.68 0.68
Maximum 9 100 100 100 68 552,306,126.68 2,000.68
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The model verifi es whether a virtual DMU exists which con-
sumes a lower quantity of input than that consumed by the real 
DMUs observed. The second equation provides a constraint that 
requires the output of virtual DMUs “λjxjn” to be greater or equal 
to that of the real DMU “yj0n.” Then, the constraints provided by 
the third equation admits frontier with VRS. 
Consistent with the literature35 and the data available, we 
consider four inputs (the sum of amortization, depreciation, and 
interest paid; staff costs; other operating costs; and the length 
of the mains) and two outputs (population served and production 
value). Then we used a regression model to explore the causal 
relationship between some board features and a DEA score as 
VRSTE in order to investigate the effects of the real capability 
of a company to purchase, mix and consume inputs. The model 
is based on six independent variables for governance features:
● Ownership structure (OS), a dummy used to distinguish
between fully publicly owned fi rms (0) and mixed-ow-
nership or fully privately owned fi rms (1);
● Board size (BS), measured by the number of board mem-
bers;
● Women (WOM), measured by the percentage of female
directors;
● Degree (GRAD), measured by the percentage of gradua-
tes on the board;
● Age (AA), represented by the average age of directors;
● Politicians (POL), measured by the percentage of direc-
tors affi liated with a political party or who are/were
members of local or national government.
Moreover, the model include also four independent variables 
that aim to control for strategic and operational choices:
● Staff (STF), measured by the number of staff operating
in each DMU;
● Size (SIZE), to show the presence of scale economies,
measured by the total amount of production va-
lue/1000;
● Group (GR), a dummy variable used to show if a DMU is
part of a group of fi rms (1: yes; 0: no);
● Gross sale (GS), a dummy variable used to show if a DMU
operates in the wholesale segment (1: yes; 0: no).
We chose a Tobit regression function since it describes the 
relationship between a non-negative dependent variable and the 
independent variables well. Scholars frequently associate Tobit 
functions with DEA models when studying performance across se-
veral industries because the dependent variable value, measured 
by DEA scores, is restricted between 0 and 136. This two-stage ap-
proach is not without criticism37. One would expect DEA scores to 
35 Guerrini and Romano, 2014.
 36 Aly et al., 1990. Byrnes et al., 2010. Chirkos and Sears, 1994. Dietsch and 
Weill, 1999. Ray, 1991. Sexton et al., 1994. Stanton, 2002.
37 Simar and Wilson, 2004, 2007.
correlate with each other, as the calculation of effi ciency of one 
fi rm incorporates observation of all other fi rms. Thus, regression 
analysis cannot be robust with this multicollinearity problem. For 
this reason, a double bootstrapping technique can better reveal 
the impact of exogenous and operational variables on effi ciency 
scores38. However, Banker and Natarajan (2008) have demonstra-
ted that a DEA two-stage approach with ordinary least squares 
(OLS) or Tobit outperforms the one-stage parametric method, 
such as Translog and Cobb–Douglas, to defi ne the production fron-
tier. Furthermore, a two-stage approach, such as the one adopted 
in this study, yields consistent estimates of the impact of environ-
mental and operational variables on effi ciency. Despite some cri-
ticisms of this method, it offers an appropriate means to answer 
our research questions, considering its widespread prior use39 as 
well as its effectiveness compared with alternative approaches, 
such as the one-stage parametric method40, OLS, the Papke–Wool-
dridge Method, and the unit-infl ated beta model41. 
Furthermore, we adopted a general panel data regression 
model under the assumption of random effects. General panel 
data regression models help check for individual specifi c effects 
that are not measured by the explanatory variables and refer to 
specifi c features of each selected fi rm and year observed. When 
the individual specifi c effects are kept “fi xed,” they are included 
among the independent variables as a “specifi c constant” (αi); 
in contrast, in the random effects model, the individual speci-
fi c effects are regarded as a component of the error term, as 
follows:
VRSTEit= βit*OSit+ βit*GRit + βit*GSit + βit*BSit + βit*WOMit + βit*GRADit 
+ βit*AAit + βit*POLit +βit*STFit + βit*SIZEit +eit
where: i=1,2,3,…..,N; t=1,2,…..,T
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Tables 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics of DEA scores 
and their trends over the three years, respectively. In compari-
son to prior studies applying DEA to Italian water utilities42, the 
current scores are higher, showing a greater effi ciency of fi rms. 
The possible reason for this difference may be explained by the 
analysis of both mono- and multi-utilities made by Guerrini et al. 
(2013) and the older data of the prior papers, which were based 
on 2007 and 2008 data. The tables demonstrate that the effi cien-
cy of utilities grew. Considering that the average scores recorded 
in 2008 were 0.78 CRSTE, 0.83 VRSTE, and 0.94 SCALE, there has 
been more than a 14 percent increase in global effi ciency and a 
9.6 percent increase in technical pure effi ciency. Thus, despite 
the credit crunch and the associated diffi culties in collecting new 
funds, the water industry has performed better than in previous 
years. This is perhaps attributable to the process of corporatiza-
38 Assaf and Matawie, 2010. Peda et al., 2013.
 39 Byrnes et al., 2010. García-Sánchez, 2006. Renzetti and Dupont, 2009. 
Tupper and Resende, 2004.
40 Banker and Natarajan, 2008.
 41 Hoff, 2007.
42 Guerrini et al., 2013. Romano and Guerrini, 2011.
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tion started with the reform of 1994 (the so-called Galli Law) and 
to the new attention placed on the sector by the second wave of 
reforms that began in 2008.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of DEA Scores
CRSTE VRSTE SCALE
Mean 0.89 0.91 0.98
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum 0.61 0.61 0.80
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.07 0.03
Table 4. Trends in Effi ciency from 2010 to 2012
CRSTE VRSTE SCALE
2010 0.90 0.92 0.98
2011 0.89 0.92 0.98
2012 0.89 0.91 0.98
The results obtained from the regression model described in Section 3 are pre-
sented in Table 5.
Table 5. Results of the Panel Regression Model
Effi ciency (VRSTE) Estimate
OS —0.014
BS —0.010**
WOM —0.012
GRAD —0.047*
AA —0.0011
POL —0.040*
STF —0.0001***
SIZE 0.0001***
GR 0.006
GS —0.0006
(***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% signifi cance levels, respectively)
Despite claims that support the idea that corporate entities 
that are wholly or partially owned by the State or a local govern-
ment perform less effi ciently and less profi tably than privately-
owned ones43, our results show that ownership structure does 
not have a signifi cant effect on the effi ciency of Italian water 
utilities. Thus, it seems that ownership is not a relevant variable 
that promotes effi ciency. Prior evidence that related effi ciency 
to ownership in the Italian water sector is confl icting: Romano 
and Guerrini (2011) used one-year data to show that public fi rms 
are more effi cient than mixed-owned utilities; however, more re-
cently Guerrini and Romano (2014) showed that public fi rms re-
ceived signifi cantly lower DEA scores when compared to those of 
mixed-ownership and private fi rms. Therefore, the current result 
seems to confi rm that other corporate governance features than 
43 Boycko et al., 1996. Shleifer and Vishny, 1994.
ownership structure are able to infl uence that effi ciency of water 
utilities, namely board size and composition.
Only three independent variables that describe board size 
and composition have a robust signifi cance level on effi ciency 
with a p-value at least lower than 10 percent: BS, GRAD, and POL. 
The empirical evidence suggests that as larger boards negatively 
affect effi ciency, fi rms should reduce the number of directors, 
structuring tighter boards able to expedite decision-making. This 
result is in line with the literature44 that affi rms that when boards 
grow they may work less effectively and that larger boards are 
more likely to have diffi culties in coordinating, communicating, 
participating in, and being committed to improving corporate 
performance45. Moreover, it confi rms the relevance of current 
legal provisions that in Italy regulated the size of the boards of 
the utilities owned, wholly or partially, by public shareholders 
by providing a threshold of fi ve board members for fully publicly 
owned utilities. 
The results show that the presence of directors affi liated to a 
political party or who are/were members of local or national go-
vernment entities negatively affects effi ciency. This could occur 
since politicians often get legitimacy through consensually-driven 
and populist policies, based on massive public spending and in-
tense recruitment of workforces in those fi rms where a local go-
vernment or the State exert a relevant role. This result seems to 
confi rm the relevance of the legal provision in Italy that bans the 
appointment of any politicians who have operated in the previous 
three years as administrators of the local authority owning the 
utility. However, a prior study using 2011 data on Italian water 
utilities46 found a correlation between the presence of politicians 
and the capability to collect funds from banks and other public 
sources (EU and regions). In fact, the funding problem is currently 
one of the most relevant in the management of local utilities47 
and the political affi liations of board members could contribute 
to improve the funding opportunities of the fi rm. 
Prior evidence that college or university graduates on the 
board affect productivity in a slightly negative way48 was confi r-
med when the level of education of board members is taken into 
consideration. This could be explained by the fact that only half 
of the board members in our dataset have these educational cre-
dentials; furthermore, many members have degrees not strictly 
related to water management, such as in veterinary science, me-
dicine or foreign languages. Therefore, the research fi ndings con-
fi rm that having a degree is not a suffi cient condition for better 
decision-making processes or performance improvement.
Demographic characteristics, such as gender representation 
and average age, did not affect effi ciency. However, the low pre-
sence of women in the board (less than 10%) included in our da-
taset makes it diffi cult to observe their effect on performance; 
since female directors represent a small minority, we can suppose 
both that gender board diversity is not relevant for effi ciency or 
 44 Jensen, 1993.
45 Goodstein et al., 1994. Guest, 2009. Judge and Zeithaml, 1992. Yermack, 
1996.
46 Romano and Guerrini, 2014.
47 Romano et al., 2013.
48 Romano and Guerrini, 2014.
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that only one or two female members may not feel comfortable 
on male-dominated boards, and have diffi culties renovating po-
licies and organizations. With reference to the average age of 
board members, it is relevant to point out that in our dataset the 
average age is around 53 years old, lower than the average age 
of the managers of many sectors of the Italian economy, from 
banks to SOEs49. 
The effects of two strategic and operational features of fi rms 
(integration in a group with other utilities operating in water ser-
vices and/or in related public services such as solid waste, envi-
ronmental service, gas and electricity, and wholesale activities) 
were examined but these variables were not found to have a sig-
nifi cant effect on effi ciency. 
Finally, the control variables SIZE and STF have a key role in 
pure technical effi ciency. When production value increases, fi rms 
improve effi ciency; conversely, the growth of staff members da-
mages productivity. The fi rst result is in line with evidence from 
prior DEA literature on water management, demonstrating that 
economies of scale characterize the industry. Recently, Guerrini 
and Romano (2014) have shown that economies of scale could 
really affect those water utilities that collect more than 50 mi-
llion euros in revenues. Consequently, the capability to purchase 
and consume input grows with turnover. 
CONCLUSION
This paper investigated whether the corporate governance 
of water utilities (i.e. their ownership, board size and board com-
position) affects fi rms’ decisions and ultimately impacts the level 
of effi ciency reached. The study used a database compiled from 
255 observations of 85 Italian water utilities and over 1100 board 
members. It applied a two-stage method using DEA to determine 
the relative effi ciency of utilities and panel regression to analy-
ze the relationship between their effi ciency and corporate go-
vernance (ownership, board size, and political connection, age, 
education and gender of board members) and strategic features 
(production value, number of employees, membership in a corpo-
rate group and provision of gross sale water service). 
The results confi rm the importance of the legal provisions 
in Italy that regulate the size and composition of the boards of 
the utilities owned, wholly or partly, by public shareholders by 
providing a threshold for full public ownership (no more than 5 
board members) and mixed ownership (no limitations on board 
size but no more than 5 members appointed by the public share-
holders) of utilities. Moreover, the law bans any politicians who 
have operated in the previous three years as administrators of a 
local authority that owns the utility (full public or mixed owner-
ship). The present study highlights that the effi ciency of water 
utilities is negatively affected as the size of their board and the 
presence of politically connected directors grow. Confi rming prior 
evidence, we found that the presence of graduates on the board 
negatively affects effi ciency, which could be explained by the 
fact that only half of the board members in the dataset have a 
degree and many members have degrees not strictly related to 
 49 Coldiretti/Gruppo, 2013.
water management. Ownership and demographic characteristics 
(gender representation and average age) did not affect effi cien-
cy. Finally, the effects of the control variables analyzed are con-
trasting: while group membership and wholesale activities do not 
have a signifi cant effect on effi ciency, production value and the 
number of employees confi rm the existence of economies of scale 
in the industry. 
To further analyze the effect of corporate governance on 
effi ciency of water utility fi rms, the present study could be ex-
panded to include in the dataset multi-sector utilities offering 
more than one public service, considering the scope of opera-
tion as a control variable to explain a fi rm’s performance. The 
observation period could also be extended. Moreover, another 
limitation is the endogeneity problem, which impacts much of 
the board-related literature50, considering that board composi-
tion may infl uence fi rm performance but the latter may in turn 
infl uence the selection of board members.
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